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Kerrie Kline 
Prof. Ambrosio, Law & Morality: For AWR Credit 
 
TARP, a Just Act 
 
Introduction 
In September 2008, big businesses were failing and the Nation was losing almost 800,000 
jobs a month.1  The stock market plummeted 770 points, the equivalent of $1.2 trillion, in a 
single day.2 The credit markets were freezing up, reaching well beyond the borders of Wall 
Street and into the home of the average American family. Household wealth had fallen by 17 
percent – more than five times the decline in 1929.3 The circumstances were bad and worsening. 
It was believed that the Nation was sitting on the precipice of a second Great Depression. 
Life was desperate during the Great Depression. To stay warm, to stay alive, some people 
were forced to search outdoors for lumps of coal or burn nonessentials such as the family piano 
or kitchen table. Captured within a picture taken during 1931, a wall of skinny men stand in 
dusty, worn suits with their hands burrowed deep in their pockets.  Most of their faces hang 
towards the ground revealing only the tops of their tattered hats. Despondent weariness is all that 
is conveyed on the faces of those who stare forward. The men stand in a line but to say “line” 
implies an element of progression which seems impossible. At the end of the line a sign reads, 
“Free Soup Coffee and Doughnuts for the Unemployed.” As the line of men extends into the 
distance, one body becomes indistinguishable from the next.  The mass continues on and quietly 
disappears out of frame.  There were worse alternatives to waiting in line for hours for a cup of 
                                                 
1
US DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, WHY TARP WAS NECESSARY, [Herein, Treasury, Why TARP Was Necessary] 
 http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about-tarp/Pages/Why-TARP-was-Necessary.aspx   
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014) 
2 Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed: Approximately $1.2 trillion in market value is gone after the House rejects the 
$700 billion bank bailout plan, CNN Money (September 29, 2008), 
 http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets_newyork/ 
3 Treasury, Why TARP Was Necessary, supra note 1. 
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soup or a dough nut. During the Great Depression it was not uncommon to know of someone 
who starved to death because they simply could not afford or obtain food.  
These victims were not only starved of food but of the core goods which give human life 
meaning. That is, the ability to live and procreate, to seek knowledge, to play, to enjoy aesthetic 
experiences, to act with reason, and to participate in religion, friendship and community.4 
Another Great Depression would have catastrophically injured these intrinsic values that are the 
basis of human action (the good). Such unacceptable harm warrants an unprecedented response.  
Though the Troubled Asset Relief Program was controversial and unprecedented, Congress was 
justified in enacting it as it was done for the purpose of preventing catastrophic harm to the good.     
A Backdrop for Congressional Action- The Subprime Mortgage Backed Security: 
The root cause of the economic turmoil which climaxed in September 2008, was the 
expansion of the mortgage backed security market into subprime lending.5 Other contributing 
causes, such as low common equity levels, poor liquidity risk management, and uneven 
regulation of large financial institutions, added to the severity of the crisis.6 The expanse of the 
subprime mortgage backed security, however, was detrimental not only because of its vast 
presence throughout critical financial markets, but also because of the corrosive manner in which 
it expanded.  
A mortgage backed security is a share of the interest which a bank gains by loaning 
money to a borrower to purchase a home. This interest can be held by the bank or sold, in pieces 
                                                 
4John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights, at *102 (Paul Craig eds., Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2011).  
5 Neil Fligstein and Adam Goldstein, Catalyst of Disaster: Subprime Mortgage Securitization and the Roots of the 
Great Recession, Department of Sociology, University of California, at *23. (2009) 
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Fligstein_Catalyst%20of%20Disaster_0.pdf (Last 
visited 3/17/2014).   
6 Paul Saltzman et. al., A Spirited Conversation Assessing the Risks and Benefits of Big Banks, 16 NC Banking Inst 
1, 7-8 (2012). 
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or whole, to investors.7 Mortgage backed securities may be bundled with many other loans and 
sold in packages to larger banks which then may slice and resell the packages to investors. 8 The 
larger purchasing banks may also repackage the mortgage backed securities and sell them in the 
form of collateral debt obligations (“CDOs”).9 This repeated splicing and repacking is significant 
for two reasons. The practice served to conceal the grade of the underlying security,10 and it 
provided the mortgage backed security with various avenues to thoroughly penetrate the 
financial system.  
Standard mortgage backed securities are generally a safe investment tool.11 When 
housing prices are on the rise, as they had been up until 2006, there is enough collateral pooled in 
the market to cover mortgage loan defaults.12 Under these conditions mortgage backed securities 
provide a low-risk, high-return investment product.13 These desirable, safe returns increased the 
demand for mortgage backed securities to such a degree that lenders were released from all 
liability for default occurrences.14 That is, mortgage backed securities were sold so quickly, that 
when a default occurred it was after the instrument had been transferred to the 
investor/purchaser. Thus, it became the purchaser of the mortgage backed security who bore the 
risk of loss. To keep up with high demand, the banks - no longer concerned about loss from 
uncollectable interests - began loaning aggressively to borrowers who posed higher risks of 
defaulting (“subprime borrowers”).15 To keep mortgage backed securities desirable and to offset 
                                                 
7 Fligstein and Goldstein, supra, at *4. 
8 Richard E Mendales,  Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO 
Meltdown and How to Fix It, available at 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1359 (Last visited 3/17/2014).   
9 Fligstein and Goldstein, supra, at *11. 
10 Id. at *28. 
11 Id.   
12 Id.     
13 Id.   
14 Id. at *13.  
15 Id.     
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the increased risk presented by subprime defaults, use of adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”) 
increased.16 ARMs begin with an initial period of low fixed interest rates that would adjust to 
higher rates over time.17 Commonly the higher rates would become so excessive that borrowers, 
who had the ability to pay initially, would default when the higher increases took effect. To an 
investor these were riskier securities but offered higher dividends.18    
The economic crisis began to erupt in 2006 with the bursting of the housing bubble.19 At 
that time, foreclosure rates began to rise as a bulk of early issued ARMs reset to higher interest 
rates.20 The release of more homes on the market stalled the historically increasing real estate 
values.21 With real estate values declining, some borrowers found themselves in a situation 
where they owed more for their home than it was worth.22 This made the option to walk away 
from a home increasingly attractive raising foreclosure rates even further. The construction 
industry, unable to compete with a real estate market flooded with discounted foreclosure homes, 
necessarily had to shrink to adjust for the decreased work load.23 This further increased already 
high unemployment rates consequently placing more homeowners in financially stressed 
situations.24 As a result of excessive defaults, the subprime mortgage backed security market had 
completely collapsed.25   
                                                 
16 Id. at *4, *19. “Increasingly from 2003-2007, the number of mortgages issued that were subprime went from 
being about 30% of the total to almost 70% of the total.” 
17 Id. at *4.    
18 Id. at *19. 
19 Fligstein and Goldstein, supra at *4. 
20 Id. at *19. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at *21. 
23 ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT: Responding to the Economic Crisis Fostering Industrial 
Restructuring and Renewal at *16. (July 2009) [Herein OECD Report] Available at 
 http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/43387209.pdf (Last visited 3/17/2014) 
24 “The crisis was causing our economy to collapse.  We were losing almost 800,000 jobs a month and household 
wealth had fallen by 17 percent – more than five times the decline in 1929.”   
Treasury, Why TARP Was Necessary, supra note 1.  
25 Fligstein and Goldstein, supra, at *32. 
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Many financial institutions in the United States and abroad had purchased large amounts 
of mortgage backed securities and CDOs.26 When the market for these securities collapsed, the 
institutions holding these investments found themselves with billions invested in what became 
worthless assets.27  This created liquidity crises which resulted in a domino effect of institutional 
failures (or near-failures) branding subprime mortgages with the appropriate prefix “toxic.”28 By 
September 2008, the major U.S. financial institutions Bear Stearns, Indy Mac, and Washington 
Mutual bank had failed and Lehman Brothers was in bankruptcy.29 Toxic assets were so 
thoroughly embedded through-out the economy that their depreciated value within the credit 
markets caused the Nation’s financial system to freeze.30 Americans rely on credit and liquid 
markets to make our economy function. Frozen credit lines meant consumers could not finance 
necessities and businesses could not access capital to run their day-to-day business.31 Business 
closings were increasing and the nation was losing almost 800,000 jobs a month, further 
exacerbating lending needs and defaulting rates.32 Confidence in the financial system nearly 
evaporated.33 
On September 29, 2008, just following the announcement of Congress’ rejection of the 
first version of a rescue package, panic erupted with a stock market free fall that resulted in the 
                                                 
26 “When the housing market inevitably turned down, starting in 2006, the pace of mortgage defaults accelerated at 
an unprecedented rate. By mid-2007, rising mortgage defaults were undermining the performance of many 
investments held by major financial institutions.” 
U.S. STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY , CITIZENS’ REPORT: ON THE 
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (TARP) (March  2, 2010),  available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Documents/Eighth%20Tranche%20Report_2009%2010%2007.pdf  
27 Id. at *12.   
28 Treasury, Why TARP Was Necessary, supra note 1. 
29 Id   
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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single day loss of 770 points/$1.2 trillion.34 “Americans were questioning the safety of their 
money in banks. For the first time in more than 80 years, a generalized run on the nation's 
banking system was a real possibility.”35  And then AIG, one of the largest and most complex 
financial firms in the world, announced that it sat on the precipice of failure.36 The Federal 
Reserve and Treasury had exercised what actions they could under existing law but it was not 
enough to decelerate the economy’s tumble.37 “It was out of these extraordinary circumstances 
that TARP was born.”38  
Congress Acts to Contain Economic Turmoil - TARP’s Objectives:    
Congress enacted the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on October 3, 2008, as part 
of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.39  The goal of this rescue initiative was to 
stabilize the economy and thaw the frozen credit markets by providing the Federal Government 
with the authority to purchase certain types of troubled assets.40 The presumption was that 
through this purchase power, the Federal government could create a market for the toxic 
subprime mortgages (and related assets) which would stir the stagnant lending system and stave 
off failures of “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions. Restored investor confidence in the market 
was the anticipated net affect.41   
                                                 
34  Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed: Approximately $1.2 trillion in market value is gone after the House rejects the 
$700 billion bank bailout plan, CNN MONEY (September 29, 2008), 
 http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets_newyork/ 
35 Tim Massad, Remarks of Assistant Secretary Tim Massad at the Brookings Institution on TARP, (9/30/2013) 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2175.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) 
36 Id.   
37 Id.    
38 Treasury, Why TARP Was Necessary, supra note 1.  
39 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat 3765 (2008)(12 U.S.C. § 5201 – 
5253). 
40 Id. Section, *Synopsis. 
41 “The purpose of the actions taken and programs created under TARP was to make sure our financial system did 
not collapse. The financial system is the circulatory system for our nation’s financial and economic health. The 
financial system enables people to have a checking account, get a credit card, receive their payroll deposits, buy a 
home, finance a college education, and save for retirement. It enables businesses to get financing so that they can 
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The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act sought to improve the declining economic 
conditions through several mechanisms. The Act provided income tax relief for individuals, tax 
incentives for energy efficient initiatives and it increased federal deposit insurance on amounts 
held in banks to $250,000 from $100,000.42 The TARP provision embodied Congress’ most 
aggressive tactic as it granted authorization to the Secretary of the Treasury (“Treasury”) to 
purchase, and make commitments to purchase, troubled assets43 from financial institutions.44 
Treasury was given access to $700 billion taxpayer dollars to use as it deemed necessary and in 
accordance with the Act.45 Congress provided guiding considerations to which Treasury was 
obliged to follow in creating a governance policy that detailed the mechanisms, methods, 
procedures and criteria which it would use in exercising its newly gifted authority.46  
Accordingly, Treasury detailed its developing programs and the disbursements made under those 
programs in Tranche Reports and Monthly Reports.47 Under the authority provided by TARP, 
Treasury implemented programs in five key target areas: Bank Investments, Credit Markets, 
AIG, Auto Investments and Housing.48  Of the potentially $700 billion at the program’s disposal, 
                                                                                                                                                             
grow and expand and hire more people. And without TARP and the government’s other emergency measures, the 
pain experienced by Americans would have been far greater, recovery would have been far slower, and the ultimate 
cost to repair the damage would have been far higher.”  
See Treasury, Why TARP Was Necessary, supra note 23. 
42 Id. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 136(a)(1), and § 303. 
43 12 USCA § 5211, § (9) TROUBLED ASSETS.—The term “troubled assets” means— 
(A) residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or 
related to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of 
which the Secretary determines promotes financial market stability; and 
(B) any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which is necessary to promote financial 
market stability, but only upon transmittal of such determination, in writing, to the appropriate committees of 
Congress. 
44 Id. § 5211 (a) – (e). 
45 Id.  § 5225 (a)(3). 
46 Id.  § 5211 (d)(1)-(4), § 5213 (1) –(9). 
47 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIRST TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS (November 4, 2008). Available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/Tranche-Reportfinal.pdf  
48TIM MASSAD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, CITIZENS REPORT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2011 (February 15, 2012). Available at  http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefing-
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a total of $465.5 billion was utilized, most of which was in the area of stimulating the National 
Banking System.49  
1) The Bank Investment Programs 
Treasury invested approximately $245 billion across five separate banking programs all 
focused on stabilizing the banking system as a whole.50  1) The Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program and the Capital Assistance Program provided a two part system focused on identifying 
and supporting institutions at risk.51 Designed by the Federal Reserve Bank and implemented in 
conjunction with the Treasury, the combined goal of these two programs was to ensure that 
banks would be strong enough to weather worsening conditions.52 The first program tested the 
financial stability of individual institutions.53 If under this test a bank could not raise sufficient 
private capital, the second program could be utilized to supply government support. The 
structured procedure to identify and correct potential instability was intended to reinforce 
investor confidences and thus stimulate lending.54 2) The Capital Purchase Program, the first 
program executed by the Treasury, provided capital to viable financial institutions of all sizes.55 
                                                                                                                                                             
room/reports/agency_reports/Documents/FY%202011%20TARP%20Citizens%20Guide%20%202%2015%2012.pd
f  
49US DEP’T OF TREASURY, SECTION ON TARP, REPORTS. http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Pages/TARP-Tracker.aspx   (last visited Feb. 28, 2014)  
50 Add TARP Treasury Banking link http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-
investment-programs/Pages/default.aspx  
51 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: 
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, at *5,*6 (April 24, 2009). Available at, 
 http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf  
52 Id.  
53 “19 of the Nation’s largest banks were tested,18 were determined to adequate capital the one that did not was able 
to raise private capital.” Id.    
54 “CAP was closed on November 9, 2009 without making any investments. After the stress tests results were 
released, banks were able to raise hundreds of billions of dollars in private capital.”  
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 
(11/9/2009) http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg359.aspx    
55 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIRST TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS (November 4, 2008). Available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/Tranche-Reportfinal.pdf  
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This program focused on stabilizing the financial market as a cohesive whole.56 While other 
programs focused on large institutions which presented greater harm had they collapsed, the 
Capital Purchase Program reinvigorated overall lending to consumers and businesses by 
addressing a broader spectrum of banking institutions.57  3) The Asset Guarantee Program 
(“AGP”) was designed to support institutions whose failure would have caused serious harm to 
the financial system and broader economy.58  “This program provides guarantees for assets held 
by systemically significant financial institutions that face a risk of losing market confidence due 
in large part to a portfolio of distressed or illiquid assets.”59 Conducted jointly by Treasury, the 
Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, this program was not intended 
to be made widely available.60  4) The Community Development Capital Initiative was a 
program designed to target areas of special need.61 That was, areas of moderate or low income 
communities (or communities otherwise) underserved by traditional banks and financial service 
institutions.62 The banks, thrifts and credit unions that service these communities, dubbed 
“Community Development Financial Institutions” (“CDFIs”), were equally affected as the 
traditional institutions when the credit market began to freeze. The threat posed to the 
                                                 
56Id.  
57 Under CPP, Treasury provided capital to 707 financial institutions in 48 states. 
58 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MONTHLY REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1 2008 TO DECEMBER 31 2008 
(January 6, 2009)  
 http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/105Report_010609.pdf   
59 Id. 
60 “Two institutions received assistance under the AGP - Bank of America and Citigroup. The program began in 
January 2009 and is now closed. To date, taxpayers have earned more than $3 billion in positive returns from the 
AGP.” 
US DEP’T OF TREASURY, SECTION ON TARP, REPORTS [Herein, Treasury, Reports – Bank]   
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-
programs/agp/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) 
61  US DEP’T OF TREASURY, Press Release: Treasury Announces Special Financial Stabilization Initiative 
Investments of $570 Million in 84 Community Development Financial Institutions in Underserved Areas, [Herein 
Treasury – Press Release], (September 30, 2010)  http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg885.aspx  
62 Treasury – Press Release, supra note 61. 
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underserved communities, however, was exacerbated as they had fewer sources available to 
pursue financing in the first place. Under this program, the CDFIs received investments of 
capital and the ability to exchange securities received under the Capital Purchase Program, for 
securities with more favorable terms.63 5) The Targeted Investment Program “was created to help 
stabilize institutions considered systemically significant, to prevent broader disruption of 
financial markets.”64 This program gave the Treasury flexibility to provide a revolving line of 
credit to Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America, both deemed systemically significant, to assist 
them in staving off collapse.65   
Distributions under all 5 of the banking programs have been concluded.66 As for the 
investments which Treasury still owns an interest in, it is in the process of winding them down in 
a way, “that maximizes returns for the taxpayers and promotes America's financial stability.”67 In 
all, taxpayers have recovered more than the amount invested in the five banking programs, 
netting a total gain of $23.4 billion.68 69  
2) Credit Market Programs 
Through its TARP provided powers, Treasury launched three programs focused on 
restarting the flow of credit. The Public-Private Investment Program (“PPIP”) was designed to 
                                                 
63 Eighty four institutions received investments totaling approximately $570 million.  
Treasury, Reports – Bank, supra note 60. 
64 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FOURTH TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS (January 7, 2009)[Herein 4th 
Tranche]   
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/Fourth-Tranche-Report.pdf  
65 Treasury purchased $20 billion in preferred stock from each Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America.  
Id.  
66 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BANK INVESTMENT PROGRAMS: PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW,  
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-
programs/Pages/default.aspx  (Last visited February 28, 2014) 
67 Id. 
68 US DEP’T OF TREASURY, SECTION ON TARP, REPORTS, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Pages/TARP-Tracker.aspx  (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).  
69 Amount was determined by the reported cash back amount of $273.4 billion minus the amount obligated, $250.5 
billion.  
Id. 
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mitigate asset valuation problems relative to mortgage backed securities.70 When the mortgage 
backed security market collapsed, financial institutions were left holding portfolios of distressed 
or illiquid assets which were hard to value.71 The pressure to build credit and reduce debt forced 
the value of other financial assets to drop below market prices.72 To facilitate price discovery, 
PPIP provided a purchasing program which combined public and private investment dollars.73  
The Small Business Administration Securities Purchase Program (SBA) 7(a), recognized 
that obtaining credit was a critical need of small businesses.74 To resuscitate the flow of credit to 
small businesses, targeted investments of $368 million were made to purchase working capital, 
machinery based and equipment based securities.75 This injection of liquidity into the secondary 
market was designed to promote small business lending by increasing the capital available to 
small business loan originators.76 The Termed Asset Backed Loan Facility program addressed, 
head-on, consumers’ inability to obtain financing.  The program did so by facilitating loans to 
“any qualified borrower that owned eligible collateral.”77   
3) AIG  
The American International Group, Inc., (AIG) is one of the largest insurance companies 
in the world. In September 2008, at the peak of the financial disaster, AIG faced a severe 
liquidity crisis that placed it on the brink of failure. As the frozen credit markets foreclose the 
                                                 
70 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TARP PROGRAMS: CREDIT MARKET PROGRAMS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
PROGRAM, PROGRAM PURPOSE & OVERVIEW, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-
Programs/credit-market-programs/ppip/Pages/purpose-and-overview.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
71 Id.   
72 Id.   
73 Id.    
74 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,SBA 7(A) SECURITIES PURCHASE PROGRAM: PROGRAM PURPOSE & OVERVIEW, 
[Herein SBA 7] http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/credit-market-
programs/sba7a/Pages/Program-Purpose-And-Overview.aspx  (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).  
75 Id.    
76 SBA 7, supra note 74. 
77 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY SECTION 105(A) TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM REPORT TO 
CONGRESS FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1 2008 TO DECEMBER 31 2008, at *5, (January 6, 2009) Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/105Report_010609.pdf  
13 
 
availability of private funding solutions, the firm’s only survival option was through government 
assistance. The government, acting initially through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
provided assistance to the firm based on the belief that had the company failed, its impact on the 
already crumbling economic condition would have been devastating.78  The Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York provided the firm with a combined commitment of $182 
billion.79 In December 2012, AIG completed its repayment plan providing an overall positive 
return to the government of $22.7 billion.80   
4) Auto Investments 
The reach of the economic crisis extended well beyond financial institutions. Frozen 
credit markets greatly restricted consumers’ ability to obtain financing needed to purchase 
vehicles.81  The unavailability of car loans coupled with increasing unemployment rates resulted 
in a drastic forty-percent decline in automotive sales.82  The American automobile industry, 
already teetering on collapse, was thrust even closer to the edge of insolvency.  Failure of the 
large auto manufacturers would have necessarily impacted related services up and down the 
                                                 
78 Treasury – Press Release, supra note 61. 
79 “September 16, 2008: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces it will provide a two-year, $85 billion 
secured revolving credit facility to AIG.  November 10, 2008: In order to hold residential mortgage-backed 
securities from AIG life and retirement services companies and collateralized debt obligations from counterparties 
of AIG Financial Products Corp., AIG and the FRBNY establish the Maiden Lane II and III special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs), respectively. AIG provides $1 billion in subordinated funding and the FRBNY provides up to $22.5 billion 
in senior funding for Maiden Lane II.  AIG provides up to $5 billion in subordinated funding and the FRBNY 
provides up to $30 billion in senior funding to Maiden Lane III.  November 25, 2008: The Treasury invests an 
additional $40 billion under the Troubled Asset Relief Program in AIG through the purchase of AIG preferred 
stock.  AIG uses the proceeds to reduce its outstanding debt with the FRBNY from $85 billion to $60 billion.”  
AIG.COM, http://www.aig.com/americas-profit_3171_437856.html 
80 Of the $22.7 billion, Treasury realized a positive return of $5.0 billion and the Federal Reserve realized a positive 
return of $17.7 billion.  
Id.  
81Org. for Economic Co-Operation and Development: Responding to the Economic Crisis Fostering Industrial 
Restructuring and Renewal at *16. (July 2009) Available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/43387209.pdf (Last visited 
3/17/2014) 
82 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TARP PROGRAMS: AUTO [Herein: Treasury Programs – Auto] 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/automotive-programs/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
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supply chain thus threatening further the overall economic condition.83 Treasury responded to 
this threat by creating the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP). Under the AIFP, 
Treasury allocated approximately $80 billion to the ailing domestic auto manufacturers.84 As of 
early 2014, the Treasury has recovered $66.1 billion of the $79.7 billion disbursed under the 
program.85 While the rescued auto manufacturers are now solvent, it is likely this initiative, when 
considered in isolation, will result in a net loss to the government.  
5) Housing Programs 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act sought to provide assistance to homeowners 
in two ways. First, in the section titled “HOPE for Homeowners Amendments,” it amended the 
National Housing Act to expand its eligibility requirements.86 Secondly, it directed the Treasury, 
under its TARP powers, to modify the terms of mortgages with the precise goal of reducing 
foreclosure rates.87 Treasury established two programs, focused on this initiative: 1) The Making 
Home Affordable program seeks to prevent avoidable foreclosures by providing mortgage relief 
to qualifying homeowners through several different platforms.88 Included in one such platform 
was the Home Affordable Modification Program which serves to permanently reduce mortgage 
payments to affordable levels for those borrowers who qualify.89  2) The Hardest Hit Fund was 
created to provide equitable relief to those states impacted more significantly by the deteriorating 
                                                 
83 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FOURTH TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS (January 7, 2009). Available 
at, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/Fourth-Tranche-Report.pdf   
84 Treasury Programs – Auto, supra note 82.   
85 Id. 
86 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat 3765, Section 124 (2008). 
87 12 U.S.C. § 5219, 5220  (2008) 
88 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TARP PROGRAMS: HOUSING  [Herein, Treasury Programs – Housing] 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/automotive-programs/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
89 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FOURTH TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS [Herein, 4th Tranche] (April 
29, 2009).  
Available at,  
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Documents/Sixth%20Tranche%20Report%20with%20appendix_042409.pdf  
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economic and housing markets.90 The criteria used to determine which areas to target as those 
which were significantly impacted, focused on unemployment levels and housing market decline 
percentages.91 In attempt to provide extending assistance, the Housing Programs under TARP are 
currently ongoing. Applications for these programs may continue to be submitted through 
December 2015.  
Congressional Control of the Treasury  
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act delegates a great deal of authority to the 
Treasury. The basis for allocating such power was the complexity of the financial crisis and the 
perceived need for an immediate response. Congress intended for capital to be injected into the 
financial markets in a way which balanced the efficacy of tax payer dollars with the combined 
goals of rescuing financial institutions in need, fostering investor confidences and shocking the 
stalled lending market back into motion.92 The most difficult task in determining how to inject 
capital into the deteriorating credit market was how to price troubled assets. Administrative 
agencies are utilized for this exact task; that is, they provide the government with expert 
resources that can operate with more flexibility and speed than the electorate process allows. To 
provide the needed speedy and calibrated approach, it was necessary for Congress to relinquish 
this authority to an entity which had the expertise and organizational structure to respond to the 
challenge. While the power granted to the Treasury was great it was not limitless. The 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act provided guidelines to regulate Treasury’s discretion and 
a labyrinth of oversight tools detailed as follows.     
                                                 
90 Treasury Programs – Housing, supra note 88. 
91 Id.  
92 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat 3765, Section Synopsis (2008) 
(12 U.S.C. § 5201 – 5253). 
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To ensure that the Treasury did not act in excess of the authority TARP vested in it, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Board (“FSOB”) was created to review that the Treasury exercised 
its authority in accordance with the policies created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act or those policies which the act directed to be created.93  The actions which the Treasury took 
relative to appointing financial agents, designating asset classes for purchase, and structuring the 
vehicles used to purchase troubled assets, were explicitly required to be reviewed.94 FSOB was 
granted authority to ensure that Treasury’s actions aligned with the guiding principles of the act 
which were to protect the economic interest of the Nation in a way which minimized long-term 
costs and maximized benefits for taxpayers.95 Other responsibilities of the FSOB included 
making recommendations to Treasury regarding use of its TARP authority, and reporting its 
observations to Congress and the duly created Congressional Oversight Panel on a designated 
monthly and quarterly basis.96   
The Congressional Oversight Panel was responsible for receiving the quarterly reports 
created by the FSOB, comparing FSOB’s findings with the current state of the financial markets 
and thereon making an assessment of the effectiveness of the TARP actions implemented. 97   
Other reporting responsibilities the Congressional Oversight Panel was charged with appraising 
included: the Treasury’s exercise of its TARP powers, the impact of Treasury’s purchases on the 
market, and the effectiveness of foreclosure mitigation efforts again from the standpoint of 
                                                 
93 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat 3765, Section 104(a)(1)(A) 
(2008). 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  Section 104(e)(1)-(3), Section 113(a)  
96 Id.  Section 104(d),(e)(1)-(3),(g); FSOB membership included: the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the 
Fed, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. 
97 12 U.S.C. § 5233, (a),(b).   
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minimizing long-term costs and maximizing benefits for the taxpayers.98 To address the problem 
of the uneven regulation of large financial institutions, a contributing cause of the economic 
crisis, the Congressional Oversight Panel was given the duty to compile a “Special Report on 
Regulatory Reform” by January 20, 2009.99  It was directed that this inquiry focus on the quality 
of oversight provided by the regulatory system in overseeing regulated entities and protecting 
consumer interests.100   
To further bolster the oversight of authority granted by TARP, the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act established the Office of the Special Inspector General for TARP.101 Appointed 
by the President, the Special Inspector General was “responsible for auditing and monitoring the 
purchase, management, and sale of assets through TARP.”102 The Special Inspector General was 
mandated to maintain lists of the institutions participating in TARP as well as an accounting of 
the amounts of assets purchased, held and sold through the program.103  The Special Inspector 
General’s capacity to investigate purchases was comprehensive as he was additionally obligated 
to collect an explanation of the reasons the Treasury deemed it necessary to purchase each 
troubled asset and detailed biographical information on each person or entity hired to manage 
                                                 
98 12 U.S.C. § 5233, (a),(b)(1)-(4).   
99 “SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM.--The Oversight Panel shall submit a special report on 
regulatory reform not later than January 20, 2009, analyzing the current state of the regulatory system and its 
effectiveness at overseeing the participants in the financial system and protecting consumers, and providing 
recommendations for improvement, including recommendations regarding whether any participants in the financial 
markets that are currently outside the regulatory system should become subject to the regulatory system, the 
rationale underlying such recommendation, and whether there are any gaps in existing consumer protections.”  
Id. Section 125 (b)(2).   
100 Id.   
101 Id.  Section 121(a),(12 U.S.C. 5231(a)). 
102 Id.  Section 121(b)(c), (12 U.S.C. 5231(b)(c)).  
103 Id.  Section 121(c)(1)(A) - (G), (12 U.S.C. 5231(c)(1)(A) - (G)). 
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such troubled assets.104 Congress was kept abreast of these investigative efforts through 
mandated quarterly reports. 105 
In addition to the oversight responsibilities held by the FSOB, the Congressional 
Oversight Panel and the Special Inspector General, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
charged the Treasury with detailed reporting requirements to ensure transparency. With respect 
to the authority the Treasury gained through TARP, it was required to detail all actions related 
to: agreements made or renewed, all purchases made, the nature of the assets purchased, the 
types of parties involved in the purchases, the methodology behind each decision, the 
department’s operating expenses, the valuation for pricing each transaction, justification for the 
prices paid in each transaction, projected costs and liabilities related to transactions, a description 
of the vehicles established to exercise its authority, descriptions of the impact of its actions on 
the financial system and the remaining challenges facing the financial system. 106 Just as the 
Congressional Oversight Panel was assigned with analyzing the problem of the uneven 
regulation of large financial institutions, so too was Treasury.107 Where gaps in regulatory 
oversight were observed, Treasury was required to provide recommendations to promote 
improvement. 108 
                                                 
104 12 U.S.C. § 5233, (a),(b)(1)-(4).   
105 Id. Section 125(f)(12 U.S.C. § 5233, (f)).   
106 (a)(3) a detailed financial statement with respect to the exercise of authority under this Act, including— 
(A) all agreements made or renewed; 
(B) all insurance contracts entered into pursuant to section 102; 
(C) all transactions occurring during such period, including the types of parties involved; 
(D) the nature of the assets purchased; 
(E) all projected costs and liabilities; 
(F) operating expenses, including compensation for financial agents; 
(G) the valuation or pricing method used for each transaction; and 
(H) a description of the vehicles established to exercise such authority. 
Id. Section 105, (12 U.S.C. 5215 (a) – (b)(2)).  
107 Id. Section 105(c)(12 U.S.C. § 5215 (c)).  
108 Id. Section 105(c)(1) – (2),(d), (12 U.S.C. § 5215 (c)(1) – (2),(d)). 
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To protect the integrity of TARP transactions, Congress required Treasury to make 
available to the public within two days of making a purchase or trade, a description of the 
transaction and its pricing details.109 Broad disclosure requirements were placed on the 
institutions selling to the Treasury in effort to further market transparency.110 If the Treasury 
determined that an institution’s disclosures were not sufficient to provide the public with notice 
of potential exposures known to threaten the financial position of the institution, than the 
Treasury had the authority to recommend to the entity’s regulator that certain additional 
disclosures be made. 111    
Taxpayer Protections 
Woven through-out the TARP provisions of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
is the principle that the authority granted to Treasury could only be exercised in a way which 
minimized costs to the taxpayer and maximized benefits.112 Such a guiding principle could easily 
be manipulated without more instruction. To ensure that the interests of the taxpayers were 
protected, the Act proscribed safeguards which limited the discretion of the Treasury.113 One 
such measure designed to maximize the efficiency of taxpayer resources, was the directive for 
Treasury to purchase troubled assets through auctions and reverse auctions, when appropriate, 
                                                 
109 Id. Section 114 (a), (12 U.S.C. § 5224 (a)). 
110 Id. Section 114 (b), (12 U.S.C. § 5224 (b)). 
111 Id.  
112 Id. Section 113, (12 U.S.C. § 5223). The concept that the Treasury would be required to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis of each action is provided through-out the Act. “The Secretary,” referred to as Treasury herein, “shall use 
the authority under this Act in a manner that will minimize any potential long-term negative impact on the taxpayer, 
taking into account the direct outlays, potential long-term returns on assets purchased, and the overall economic 
benefits of the program, including economic benefits due to improvements in economic activity and the availability 
of credit, the impact on the savings and pensions of individuals, and reductions in losses to the Federal 
Government.” Id.;   “In exercising the authorities granted in this Act, the Secretary shall take into consideration-- (1) 
protecting the interests of taxpayers by maximizing overall returns and minimizing the impact on the national debt.” 
Id. Section 103. 
113 Id. Section 113, (12 U.S.C. § 5223). 
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and at the lowest price consistent with the Act. 114 When purchase through an auction was not 
feasible or appropriate, the Treasury was mandated to pursue additional measures to ensure that 
prices paid through direct sales were reasonable and reflected the underlying value of the 
asset.115 
Congress recognized that some companies’ riskier business practices caused their weak 
financial condition. Such businesses would have been unjustly enriched had TARP relief allowed 
them to succeed and profit at the expense of the taxpayers.  The Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act attempted to prevent such an inequitable result by prohibiting Treasury from 
purchasing troubled assets without receiving certain equitable warrants in exchange.116 By 
receiving common or preferred stock in the institution selling the troubled assets, taxpayers were 
guaranteed to share in any appreciation the institution may enjoy in the future.117  To protect 
taxpayers against loss, the warrants contained anti-dilution provisions which protected the 
interest held by the government from being diluted in stock splits, stock distributions, dividends, 
mergers, and other forms of reorganization or recapitalization.118 A conversion provision was 
required to be included within the requisite warrants which additionally protected taxpayers from 
loss by converting the government’s interest into a senior debt security if the institution’s stock 
became no longer available in public trading exchanges. 119 The conversion provided the 
Treasury with priority creditor standing, thus placing it in line to be repaid before all other 
creditors of the institution.120 
                                                 
114 Id. Section 113(b)(c), (12 U.S.C. § 5223(b)(c)). 
115 Id. Section 113(c), (12 U.S.C. § 5223(c)). 
116 Id. Section 113(d), (12 U.S.C. § 5223(d)). 
117 Id. Section 113(d), (12 U.S.C. § 5223(d)). 
118 Id. Section 113(d)(D), (12 U.S.C. § 5223(d)(D)). 
119 Id. Section 113(d)(C), (12 U.S.C. § 5223(d)(C)). 
120 Id.  
21 
 
Another taxpayer safeguard provided in the act was the prohibition upon executive 
compensation plans which incentivized unnecessary and excessive risk taking on the part of the 
institutions’ leadership.121 If a senior executive of a TARP participating institution received a 
bonus or compensation based on statements of earnings or other criteria later proven to be 
materially inaccurate, the act provided a mechanism for the institution to claw back the 
distributed payments.122 Additionally, if a company had sold troubled assets to the Treasury 
during an auction process, then the top five executives within the company were precluded from 
executing “golden parachute” contracts.123 Such contracts provide excessive compensation to the 
employee if employment is involuntarily concluded.124 These measures sought to prevent 
culpable parties from benefitting unjustly through TARP funding and from gambling 
unnecessarily with taxpayer dollars.   
Congress further sought to protect taxpayers by including a recoupment provision in the 
Act.125 The purpose of this provision was to prevent TARP dispensations from increasing the 
deficit or national debt.126 It afforded taxpayers the ability to recover from the financial industry 
the amount distributed under TARP and not returned after five years from the date of enactment 
of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.127  Upon the report of a shortfall, the President 
was required to submit to Congress, a proposal to cure the deficiency.128 
                                                 
121 The act provided that the top five highest executives within an institution which sold troubled assets to the 
Treasury through a direct-sale, must not be paid in accordance with a compensation plan designed to incentivize 
unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the firm while the Treasury holds an ownership interest. 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat 3765 (2008) Section 111 (12 U.S.C. 
§ 5221).   
122 Id. (B)(2)(b). 
123 Id. Section 111(b)(2)(C), (12 U.S.C. § 5221 (b)(2)(C)). 
124 Id. § 5223.  
125 Id. § 5239.   
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
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Was Congress’ Justified in Enacting the Troubled Asset Relief Program?:   
To determine if Congress acted justifiable when enacting TARP, what constitutes justice 
must first be established. The positivist philosophy, premised in analyzing data and empirical 
evidence, does not require that a law be moral to be justified. A positivist approach isolates the 
subject areas of law and morality believing them to operate in complete exclusion from one 
another and at no point overlapping. While such a methodology may be useful in quantifying 
whether the act had any stabilizing effect on the financial markets or U.S. economy, it would fail 
to consider the non-empirical factors which made Congress’ act controversial.129 Such a narrow 
approach may satisfy consequential theorists who evaluate the moral worth of an action solely on 
the outcome produced.  However, the consequential approach is too narrow still, as it fails to 
value the means used to achieve the ends sought.   
Martin Luther King Jr. set forth the notion that an unjust law is but a perversion of a law; 
while it may be legally binding, it is not binding in terms of conscious. This notion that a just law 
embodies a combined moral and legal purpose, is the basis of natural law theory.  If the state is 
an ethical establishment, and justice is the purpose for which law exists, then a law can only be 
justified to the extent it promotes moral good (the good). Therefore, to analyze completely 
whether Congress acted justifiably, the proper test must contemplate the good that was sought to 
be achieved. Yet, determining good is problematic as the concept of what is good is subjective 
and highly personal. It raises the question, who’s idea of good should an act by Congress be 
judged by?  
                                                 
129 That is, whether the unprecedented level of government interference in the private market would increase the 
moral hazard associated with economic risk-taking or whether public anger toward policymakers would irreversibly 
damage government credibility.   
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Natural law theory is premised on the view that certain rights are universally cognizable 
by virtue of human reason. Based on a foundation that reason is intrinsic to human dignity, John 
Finnis provides a set of guidelines to test for the good that cuts across varying belief systems. 
Finnis’ “Basic Requirements of Practical Reasonableness” consists of nine interrelated, objective 
considerations of what is practically reasonable.130 This methodology will serve as the basis for 
analyzing whether Congress was justified in enacting TARP, that is whether Congress 
reasonably acted to advance the good.   
1) A Coherent Plan of Life: 
The first consideration in determining an acts practical reasonableness is whether the act 
was part of a “coherent plan of life.”131 For TARP to have been part of a coherent plan, Congress 
must have enacted it thoughtfully; it could not have been a product of impulse or instinct.132 
TARP must operate in harmony with the other responsibilities and functions of the 
government.133 The good which was sought to be achieved should be appropriately placed 
amongst the hierarchy of other goods or basic values. 134  
TARP was an extraordinary act in that it authorized government intervention in the 
private market at an unprecedented level. It greatly expanded Treasury’s authority and provided 
$700 billion taxpayer dollars to address one problem. Though extraordinary and unprecedented 
in some respects, TARP was not inconsistent with the overall purpose of the government which 
is to protect its constituents. The challenge of stabilizing the economy was great and accordingly 
required great resources to address it.  The interference within the private market, though 
                                                 
130 John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights, at *102 (Paul Craig eds., Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2011). 
131 Finnis, Id. at *103. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 The “goods” as Finnis saw them are the distilled basic purposes of human action.  They include life, knowledge, 
play, aesthetic experience, practical reasonableness, religion and friendship/community.   
Id. at 60 – 75. 
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considerable, was executed in a measured fashion. “Minimizing the cost to taxpayer and 
maximizing the benefit” was a principle repeated throughout the act.135 This demonstrates 
Congress sought to act prudently and confine Treasury’s discretion and authority to only those 
acts which were deemed necessary.136   
The procedural checks and balances of the legislative process insulate, to a degree, 
Congressional decisions from being the product of impulse or instinct.  While this initiative did 
move through the legislative system quicker than usual, this was necessary to remedy an exigent 
condition. It was said that, “the cost of doing nothing was [is] greater than the cost of doing 
something.”137 Drawing a distinction between the result of acting immediately verses waiting to 
act, demonstrates a degree of consideration was exercised.  The House of Representatives voted 
down the first version of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act before enacting the final 
version a week later, further evidencing that the act was not impulsively created.138 The existence 
on an urgent condition was confirmed as just following the announcement of Congress’ rejection 
of the first version of a rescue package, panic erupted with a stock market free fall that resulted 
in the single day loss of 770 points/$1.2 trillion.139 Therefore since the circumstances were 
urgent and extraordinary, Congress’ prompt and correspondingly extraordinary response was 
reasonably part of a coherent plan.  
2) No Arbitrary Preferences Amongst Values: 
                                                 
135 12 U.S.C. § 5223 (2008). 
136 Id. § 5225 (a)(3). 
137 House Representative Lewis, of Georgia, 154 Cong. Rec. H10712-02, 154 Cong. Rec. H10712-02, 2008 WL 
4449108.  
138 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, H.R. 3997, Republican Policy Committee. Senate, (Sept. 28, 2008).  
139 Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed: Approximately $1.2 trillion in market value is gone after the House rejects the 
$700 billion bank bailout plan, CNN Money (September 29, 2008),  
 http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets_newyork/; Treasury, Why TARP Was Necessary, supra note 1. 
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The second consideration in determining an acts practical reasonableness is whether one 
value140 was preferred arbitrarily over another.141  “Values” as defined by Finnis, are the most 
basic goods which drive human action.142 Any commitment to a coherent plan will necessarily 
require a shifting in the concentration of one or more of these basic goods.143 While a shifting in 
attention is reasonable, it would have been unreasonable for Congress to enact TARP if it 
irrationally ignored other basic goods.144 The “goods” as distilled by Finnis include life, 
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, practical reasonableness, religion and 
friendship/community.145    
Congress enacted TARP out of the fear that the nation would face another Great 
Depression if liquidity and stability was not immediately restored to the financial system.146 
During the Great Depression household wealth dropped to the point that families found it 
difficult to purchase food, the sustenance of life. Without preserving life, there can be no 
enjoyment of anything. It is irrelevant whether the goods are defined as Finnis provides, or 
whether they encompass more lofty principles such as John Rawls’ primary goods (liberty, 
opportunity, wealth and self-respect). Congress was trying to protect that which is essential to 
life and all that comes with it. Therefore Congress, in acting to prevent another Great Depression 
sought to promote all of the basic goods regardless of form. As it did not arbitrarily prefer one 
value over another, Congress acted reasonably under this second consideration.    
3) No arbitrary preference amongst persons  
                                                 
140 By “value” Finnis is referring again to the “basic goods” which are the basic principles of human action.   
141 Finnis, supra, at *60 – *75. 
142 Id. at *104. 
143 Id. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. at *60 - *75. 
146 12 U.S.C. § 5201.  
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The third consideration in determining an acts practical reasonableness is whether the act 
arbitrarily prefers one group or class of people over another.147  With the rationale of avoiding 
another Great Depression, Congress granted authorization to Treasury to use $700 billion 
taxpayer dollars to purchase, and make commitments to purchase, troubled assets from financial 
institutions.148 Preferences are likely to exist whenever the government distributes resources. It 
would be inequitable for the government to provide food stamps to the wealthiest citizens, yet 
not doing so could be called a preference for the impoverished. The preference to save large 
financial institutions (Wall Street) was not an arbitrary decision, it was intentionally done for the 
primary purpose of protecting the good for everyone.  
To it critics, TARP0 was perceived as providing preferential treatment to Wall Street and 
big business at the expense of Main Street.149 Wall Street and the risky trading practices 
associated with it, played a role in creating the state of economic upheaval which threatened the 
nation. That is, risky trading practices propelled the expansion and demise of the mortgage 
backed security which was a primary cause of the market crash.150 It was said that, “Wall Street 
speculators, now the major donors in Federal campaigns, have used their considerable influence 
inside the halls of government, especially at the U.S. Treasury, to open up the piggy bank. 
Meanwhile, taxpayers across Main Street, who will pay the bill, will find it has no effect on 
bettering their lives as unemployment increases, foreclosures increase, and the squeeze on the 
middle class increases.”151  While TARP in effect rewarded wrongdoing, and its distribution of 
                                                 
147 Finnis, supra, at *105. 
148 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (a) – (e), 5225 (a)(3). 
149 Main Street was a term repeatedly used as Congress debated the act. While Wall Street meant the big financial 
institutions, Main Street covered the rest of Americans. 
150 See Section 2 herein, A Backdrop for Congressional Action - The Subprime Mortgage Backed Security 
151  Assemblywoman Kaptur, Ohio, 154 Cong. Rec. H10712-02, 154 Cong. Rec. H10712-02, 2008 WL 4449108 
(October 3, 2008). 
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resources seemed inequitable, it was not done arbitrarily.  Congress was acting to preserve the 
enjoyment of all basic goods which would be lost had an economic depression ensured.   
The harm which gripped big financial institutions could not be severed from Main Street. 
Americans rely on credit and liquid markets to make our economy function.  The economic crisis 
impacted Main Street in three ways. 1) Retirement plans (401K plans, municipal pension funds 
and private pension programs) are all funded through investments in a vast array of stocks, 
bonds, and other securities which plummeted along with the mortgage backed security market. 
While they would have recovered to some degree when the market began moving again, there 
was a threat they would not recover before access to the assets would be needed.152 (Drake) 2) 
The credit system enables people to have a checking account, get a credit card, receive payroll 
deposits, buy a home, finance a vehicle and pay for college.153 Without a capital injection into 
the secondary credit market, which is the larger financial institutions, small businesses and 
individual borrowers would have been precluded from accessing loans and making the necessary 
purchases for day to day survival.154 (Association Letter) 3) Capital projects, such as road work 
or school maintenance, were additionally hindered because credit was only available at 
unattainable rates or not at all.155 The economy is a free flowing circulatory system. One part of 
it cannot be walled off from another. There was no way to mitigate the impact to Main Street 
while letting the large financial institutions on Wall Street continue to fail. Congress sought to 
mitigate harm to the financial institutions so to preserve the basic good for all Americans. As it 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
152 EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION, Congressional Record - House of Representatives; PL 110–
343, 122 Stat 3765; 154 Cong. Rec. H10712-02, 154 Cong. Rec. H10712-02, 2008 WL 4449108 [Herein, House 
Congressional Rec’d.] (October 3, 2008). 
153 Treasury, Why TARP Was Necessary, supra note 1. 
154 House Congressional Rec’d, citing, John C. Drake, Boston Globe, NATIONAL UPHEAVAL, LOCAL 
SHUDDERS-CREDIT WOES CONVULSE PLANS OF CITIES, TOWNS, (October 3, 2008). 
155 Id. citing “Association Letter.”   
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did not arbitrarily prefer one group over another, Congress acted reasonably under this third 
consideration.    
The philosophy of John Rawls generally centers around concern for the least advantaged. 
This can be distinguished from Finnis’ philosophy which revolves around the good. From a 
modified (emphasis on modified) Rawls standpoint, TARP can still be considered a reasonable 
Act. The concept of distributive justice provides that burdens should be distributed to those who 
can best bear them. The $700 billion was provided by the taxpayers, to inject within the financial 
institutions. In strictly considering this case, though awkward to picture, it was the taxpayers 
who were in the best position and the large financial institutions who were the least advantaged. 
Saving the financial institutions would promote the good to all and since in this scenario they are 
the least advantaged, it would clearly be a reasonable act. Regardless of this fiction, Congress 
had a reasonable purpose in preferring Wall Street as that was the only way to protect Main 
Street. As such, Congress did not arbitrarily prefer one group above another. The Act was 
reasonable under this third analysis.   
4) & 5) Over Commitment to the Pursuit of One Good / Complete Detachment from all Other 
Goods: 
Finnis’ fourth and fifth requirements of practical reasonableness are easy to analyze 
together as they are closely complementary.156 That is, it is unreasonable for an act to pursue one 
good so blindly that all other goods are disregarded (detached).157 These are reminiscent of the 
first consideration for a coherent plan which provided that TARP must operate in harmony with 
the other responsibilities and functions of the government in order to be considered 
                                                 
156 Finnis, supra, at *109. 
157 Id. 
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reasonable.158 Congress enacted TARP to preserve all of the basic goods, as all were equally 
threatened by an economic depression. Therefore, the implementation of TARP did not offend 
Finnis’ commitment/detachment inquiry because, as said, the legislative act sought to preserve 
all goods together. Congress could have, however, violated this guideline by overcommitting 
resources to manage the maintenance of the TARP program.   
In delegating such unprecedented powers to Treasury, Congress retained various 
oversight responsibilities. Had Congress been so overwhelmed in receiving and managing the 
various reports from the Financial Stability Oversight Board, the Congressional Oversight Panel, 
the Special Inspector General and the Treasury, that it failed to respond and enact other needed 
initiatives, than it would have acted unreasonably.  It was more likely, however, that receiving 
the reports helped Congress to discover, “new and better ways for carrying out one’s 
commitments, rather than restricting one’s horizon and one’s efforts to the projects, methods, and 
routines with which one is familiar.”159  Treasury’s Monthly Report and Tranche reports 
demonstrate that the vehicles for dispersing funds were continuously re-evaluated through the 
course of the program.160 It was through the authorities which Congress granted to Treasury that 
made this possible. Such flexibility was the purpose of Finnis including this guideline in the 
                                                 
158 Finnis, supra, at *103. 
159 Id. at *110. 
160 “While there is no single action the U.S. government can take to end the financial market turmoil  and the 
economic downturn, the authorities Congress provided to Treasury under the EESA  dramatically expanded the tools 
available to Treasury to stabilize the financial system. Moving forward, Treasury is committed to ensuring that a 
financial crisis of this magnitude does not happen again. Treasury continues to work with the Federal regulators, 
Congress, and the Administration to lay out a new framework for a modern regulatory structure that will better 
enable the Federal Government to address future crises. Treasury is confident that its efforts to restore financial 
stability will lay a strong foundation for economic recovery and market stability.” 
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, EIGHTH TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS [Herein, 8th Tranche] (October 
7, 2009).  
Available at,  
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Documents/Eighth%20Tranche%20Report_2009%2010%2007.pdf    
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evaluation.  For the reasons stated herein, Congress enacted TARP with built-in vehicles for 
flexibility that prevented a blind commitment in the pursuit of its objective. Congress therefore 
acted reasonably under Finnis’ fourth and five considerations. 
6) The Relevance of Consequences, Efficiency With-in Reason:  
The sixth consideration in determining whether the TARP legislation was practically 
reasonable focuses on whether the act was efficient for its purposes.161 This consideration is to 
prevent the waste of opportunities by using inefficient methods.162  To prevent further economic 
decline, Congress intended for capital to be injected into the financial markets in a way which 
balanced the efficacy of tax payer dollars with the combined goals of: rescuing financial 
institutions in need, fostering investor confidences and shocking the stalled lending market back 
into motion.163 Congress relied on testimony from market experts from the Federal Reserve 
Board, Chairman Ben Bernanke, and from the Treasury, Secretary Henry Paulson to determine 
what amount Treasury could access. While Congress granted Treasury access to $700 billion 
dollars, it utilized only $465.5 billion. Whether the $465.5 billion was used efficiently is a 
difficult question. Hindsight allows us the benefit of knowing that a second Great Depression 
was successfully avoided. Whether that was the result of the TARP or normal market bounce 
back it is difficult to determine. In his testimony to the Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, Standford University’s John B. Taylor stated the difficult challenges in 
determining the effect TARP had on the market overall.164 “Even if one can find some stabilizing 
effects, it is clear that other actions could have been taken that did not have these rollout 
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costs.”165 While alternative vehicles may have had lowered rollout costs, it is not automatic that 
it would have increased efficiency over all. One of the rollout costs Taylor noted as an example 
of what was avoidable, was that “government officials told lawmakers in closed hearings, that 
America would experience another great depression if the TARP legislation were not passed, and 
perhaps even if it were passed. Clearly this helped cause panic in the financial markets.”166 
Taylor includes empirical data which demonstrates the stock market plummeted just after this. 
While there are claims such as Taylor’s which point to less than efficient elements of TARP 
execution, these do not prevent the legislative act from being found reasonable under Finnis’ 
sixth consideration.  
Finnis warns of the dangers of over-valuing a comparative benefits analysis.167  He says 
that methodology centered on maximizing the greatest good is irrational.168 Finnis supplies three 
justifications to limit the influence of cost-benefit analysis; he warns that taken to a logical 
extreme, cost-benefit analysis could allow for blatant evils to occur as long as it supports the 
greater good.169 Finnis says a cost-benefit analysis is arbitrary because it assumes that goods are 
commensurable, such an analysis is unreasonable when a decision is not readily quantifiable.170 
Theoretically there can be an infinite number of alternatives available in every decision, since 
assessment of alternatives could never end, it should not begin.171 Lastly, Finnis warns that such 
an analysis is easily manipulated to support a predetermined path or overpowering desire.172 As 
provided by Finnis, cost-benefit analysis is not always beneficial. It attempts to quantify non-
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commensurable concepts. A cost-benefit analysis cannot account for the incalculable costs 
associated with TARP such as the cost associated with an increase to the moral hazard of 
economic risk-taking, or the expense related to the damage done to government credibility based 
on public anger toward policymakers. Built within TARP was the principle that the authority 
granted to Treasury could only be exercised in a way which minimized costs to the taxpayer and 
maximized benefits.173 To ensure that the interests of the taxpayers were protected, the Act 
proscribed safeguards such as purchasing warrants and recoupment terms. 174  Therefore, because 
the Act does not lend itself to cost-benefit analysis and since it included protections to prevent 
against waste, it was reasonably efficient to the address the purpose sought.  
Under John Rawls modified cost-benefit analysis, TARP would again likely represent a 
reasonably efficient action. That is Rawls cost-benefit analysis seeks to determine the “net 
minimum (or lesser) evil.”175 The $700 billion was taken from tax collections already 
theoretically held by the government. This employed a concept of distributive justice because 
while some people contributed more in tax dollars than others, the greater amounts paid were 
equitably taken from those who had greater ability to pay. If further economic crisis ensued then 
the distributive calculus would shift to re-account for those who then became the less 
advantaged.  Though the bail-out affected each taxpayer, because the tax system takes less from 
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those who are least advantaged, the bail-out represented the lesser evil when compared with the 
unpredictable economic distress which was feared to result.    
Someone prescribing to the utilitarian approach will likely staunchly disagree with this 
finding. To the utilitarian, maximizing efficiency is tantamount to a basic good. As suggested by 
Finnis, this could lead to a gross abuse and is additionally a near impossible task when the issue 
is not readily quantifiable.  During the peak of the crisis, the circumstances were exigent. There 
simply was not enough time for Congress to determine the most efficient path. The Act was far 
from perfect as Congress admits. “Today's bill is not perfect but we have done what we needed 
to do for the American people. In truth if you gave every Member of Congress a chance to draft a 
proposal to address this crisis we would have 435 bills in front of us today-the enemy of the good 
is the perfect.”176 As Congress could not have responded timely if held to the utilitarian standard 
during the crisis, they should not be judged by such a faulty standard now.   
7) Respect For Every Basic Value: 
Based on the concept that “reason requires that every basic value be at the least respected 
in each and every action,” Finnis seventh requirement of reasonableness requires that TARP 
respect every basic value.177  As stated above, TARP was enacted with the purpose of preventing 
severe economic hardship to the Nation. The impact of such a catastrophe threatened the 
enjoyment of all goods. As such TARP attempted to preserve all goods. However, because of the 
expense associated with the program, had the act not included protections to secure taxpayer 
interests, then all of the goods which were sought to be protected currently may have 
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paradoxically been exposed to harm in the future. TARP’s design, however, directly addressed 
this by including various safeguards. 178  
Respect for every basic value also considers the incidental affects an act may have on 
other goods.  A test Finnis suggests to consider is whether one would make the same choice to 
act if they were the person who would be harmed.179  All of Congress would have suffered the 
harms of an economic depression or conversely the harms of over exposing the taxpayers to 
mitigate the feared condition. As such, and because of the built in balance and protection 
measures, Congress reasonably respected all basic goods in implementing the Act.   
8) The Requirements of the Common Good 
Finnis’ eighth consideration for reasonableness requires that an act favor or foster the 
common good of one’s communities.180 Discussed in detail in the second consideration, TARP 
was a controversial act based on the perceived preference of assisting Wall Street over Main 
Street. Discussed in that section, it was concluded that distinguishing between big business and 
the rest of America was a reasonable act. This eighth consideration requiring a common good, 
may in effect undercut the argument of those who believed that TARP unreasonably benefitted 
Wall Street. Wall Street, just like Main Street, is part of the American community. To watch 
Wall Street fall would not have promoted a good, it would have offended the national principle 
of community.181 “If there's a hurricane in Louisiana, we all come to the aid of the American 
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family. If there's a forest fire in California, we all come to the aid of the American family. If 
there's a blizzard in New England, we all come to the aid of the American family. And that's 
precisely what this legislation does [today]. Next week, when people are having difficulty getting 
a car loan, trying to refinance their mortgage or looking at their 401(k) plan, we acknowledge 
that they are all members of the American family, and we attempt today to come to their aid. 
There is relief here for alternative minimum tax victims; 25 million people will benefit. Twelve 
thousand businesses are waiting for incentives for the R&D credit. Four million families and 
three million teachers are waiting for their deductions for education expenses. Thirteen million 
children in low-income families can finally claim the child tax credit… This is a piece of 
legislation that helps the American family.”182 
 While it can be argued that the implementation of TARP secured the common good, 
there is also a contrary position that bailing out big businesses offended the principle of 
subsidiarity.183  That is bailing out businesses prevented them from helping themselves, it 
promoted reliance on government relief in the future.  This argument, however, is not moving. 
The only areas of the TARP package which did not require repayment were the programs which 
provided relief to mortgage holders. All other TARP funding recipients were required to repay 
the capital injections they received with interest. This promoted businesses to take responsibility 
for their business choices.184 Furthermore, TARP implemented reporting initiatives to determine 
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the flaws within the regulatory network which polices big business.185 Through these findings the 
regulatory scheme has subsequently been addressing the areas identified as needing 
improvement.186  As such, TARP can be said to have reasonably fostered the common good of 
one’s community because it sought to improve the regulatory system which monitors 
institutional risks posed to the community, and Wall Street is equally a part of the community as 
Main Street. 
9) Following One’s Conscience:  
Finnis’ ninth consideration requires an actor to follow one’s conscience and not perform 
any act to which his conscious tells him should not be done. TARP legislation was a complicated 
and controversial act. It unprecedentedly interfered in the private market to a degree which 
appeared to undermine the foundations capitalism. The justification for the act was premised on 
the belief that immediate action was necessary. Under the concept of relativism it would have 
likely come down to vote. This act did require a vote to become law, 74 Yeas from the Senate 
and 268 Yeas from the House did it though this alone does nothing to evidence morality. 
Reading through the committee reports it is clear that the common concern was what would 
happen to the nation if Congress did not implement TARP.  Assemblyman Frank summarized 
Congress’ task succinctly when he said, “today is a historic day in the United States Congress as 
the President has called on us to meet the challenge of the failure of the mortgage market, and 
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our failure to do that would not only cause a crisis in the United States but throughout the 
world.” 187   
In conclusion, the threat from the economic crisis was severe. The coming of a second 
Great Depression would have substantially threatened the good of the Nation, that is the ability 
of Americans to live and procreate, to seek knowledge, to play, to enjoy aesthetic experiences, to 
act with reason, and to participate in religion, friendship and community. Though Congress acted 
unprecedentedly in enacting the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the act itself sought to protect 
the most intrinsic and basic human values. TARP, therefore, was a just act.  
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